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The impact of the recent credit crisis on markets, banks,
and real economic performance underscores the impor-
tance of the valuation of credit risk and the role of default
probabilities. Central to this issue are the uses of both
market-implied Risk-Neutral Probabilities of Default
(hereafter, RNPDs) and Actual Probabilities of Default
(hereafter, APDs). This paper investigates links between
the two sets of probabilities and clarifies underlying
economic intuition using simple representations of credit
risk pricing. It explains why bonds with lower actual default@iimb.ernet.in
Management Bangalore. All
ponsibility of Indian Instituteprobabilities may have differentially stronger reactions to
news.
By definition, actual probabilities of events represent
measures of their likely occurrence in the real-world.
Assessments of creditworthiness by rating agencies, for
example, have historically been based on APDs estimated
using firm-level information, other data such as past
default experience, and analyst expertise. Thus, a credit
rating of AAA by Standard and Poor’s is typically meant to
reflect lower estimated odds of actual future default than
those corresponding to a BBB rating.1
A different approach is to try and extract investors’
expectations from asset market prices. It has the benefits
of relying on real-time data that aggregates the potentially
disparate information and opinions of market participants
besides being forward-looking in nature.2 However, just as1 Standard and Poor’s and CRISIL make explicit reference to their
ratings reflecting real-world default frequencies while Moody’s
makes particular mention of associated expected losses.
2 Such uses of market prices by traders, central banks, and firms
goes back many decades. Examples range from the estimation of
expectations of future interest rates from the yield curve to those
of dividend growth rates from stock prices.
4 Their data consists of yield spreads on 7-year corporate debt
from 1996 to 2004 and historical default frequencies from Moody’s
over 1970e2003.
5 Hull et al. (2005) and Berndt, Douglas, Duffie, Ferguson, and
Schranz (2005) remark that the ratio is higher for better quality
firms.
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the future, the measurement of market-implied probabili-
ties must also necessarily use a ‘model’ or assumptions.3
The reason is that prices depend on more than just the
odds of occurrence of future events (and corresponding
cash flows) – they also involve opportunity costs. So-called
market-implied risk-neutral probabilities in general,
including those pertaining to default, i.e. RNPDs, are
obtained by utilising one such assumption, viz. that inves-
tors are risk-neutral and desire no risk premia.
The assumption of risk-neutrality is obviously counter-
factual because typical investors are risk-averse and desire
compensation for bearing risk. Accordingly, the traditional
practice to pricing a credit-sensitive security sets its yield
spread (relative to the riskfree interest rate) to reflect
required returns that are commensurate with risk premia on
similar assets in addition to paying investors actuarially fair
compensation for any losses from default. On the other hand,
under the assumption of risk-neutrality, a spread is purely the
expectation of the possible loss – computed with risk-neutral
probabilities. This both serves as a definition of risk-neutral
probabilities and a means of constructing market-implied
RNPDs from spreads. Consistency between these two ways of
expressing spreads implies that an RNPD is linked to its APD
counterpart with an adjustment made for risk premia.
Thus, unlike APDs, which are in principle unbiased
predictors of future empirical or realised default frequen-
cies, RNPDs are by design almost surely bound to be wrong
as measures of real-world odds. Instead, the RNPD of
a bond can be shown to be the market-implied value of the
insurance premium on a policy that insures a bond against
default. Risk-neutral probabilities are remarkably useful in
valuation as first articulated in the pricing of stock options
and later with credit derivatives precisely because they
represent implied costs of insuring against various events.
But how useful RNPDs may be as pure indicators of likely
default does not appear to be entirely well-understood as
evidenced by a variety of interpretations among credit
market participants and observers that one encounters in
this context. Examples of news reports from the financial
press point to a mixed recognition of the fact that the RNPD
of an issuer is not necessarily a signal of only its likely
default. We show that, according to the preceding link, an
RNPD is affine in its APD with weights in this linear trans-
formation involving the risk premium. Thus, the common
belief that changes in one probability are mirrored by
similar changes in the other may stem from a tendency to
ignore the endogenous, time-varying nature of these
weights or risk premia.
Our paper sheds light on what Hull, Pedrescu & White
(2005) term the Credit Risk Puzzle. They show that RNPDs
averaged across ratings classes were 5.7% per year and
exceeded the average annual APDs of 3.7% in their sample,3 Inferences are drawn by fitting a pricing model (e.g. the Black
and Scholes (1973) option pricing model when constructing
implied volatilities). One determines what must be true for the
numerical value of a particular probability (or related moment such
as a standard deviation) which when input into the model produces
an estimate of an asset’s value that matches its observed market
price.and argue that this is consistent with risk-averse investors
requiring risk premia.4 A further striking aspect to the Hull,
Predescu, and White (2005) data is that whereas the ratio
of the (preceding) average RNPD to the average APD is
about 1.5, the average of the ratio of the two probabilities
is about 7. In other words, the relationship between the
two probabilities is significantly non-linear in the cross-
section of ratings. For instance, Aaa-rated bonds’ RNPDs
are about 17 times as large as their actual default proba-
bilities whereas the comparable ratio for ‘less safe’ Ba-
rated bonds is only about 2. However, previous work has
for the most part not commented on the implications of this
cross-sectional regularity which clearly casts doubt on
a narrow, linear interpretation of the APD-RNPD relation-
ship.5 If the excess of an RNPD over its APD counterpart is
due to a risk premium, what explains the tendency for the
highest rated bonds to have the largest RNPD/APD ratios?
Put differently, while an Aaa-rated bond is only 1/60th as
likely to default compared to a Ba-rated one, market prices
imply that insurance against default of the Aaa is only
about 1/8th as cheap. A priori, one might expect the role of
risk premia (or costs of insurance) to be least significant for
these bonds if risks were determined solely by APDs. This
non-linear RNPD/APD relationship also has implications for
the impact of news, i.e. changes or innovations in APDs. We
show that news may have differentially greater impact on
apparently safer bonds given the preceding tendency for
higher-rated debt to sell at larger RNPD/APD ratios.
While the general fact that actual and risk-neutral
probabilities differ is well-known in the academic theory
of asset pricing (see, for e.g., Dybvig and Ross (1987), there
is a paucity of analyses and discussions of the determinants
of their mutual links and the resulting implications for
credit risk. Apart from the work cited earlier, there are
a few published studies of APD-RNPD links including
Almeida and Philippon (2007), Bohn (2000), Coval, Jurek,
and Stafford (2008), Delianedes and Geske (1998), Hund
(2003), Kealhofer (2003), and Berg (2010). However, these
papers do not discuss all issues related to differences
between the two such as biases in the cross-section or time-
series. It is also important to note that all these papers
(except Coval et al) obtain their results working largely
within a Merton (1974)-type framework. This is significant
because the Black-Scholes-Merton framework has heavily
influenced much academic work and practice.6 Crucially, as6 The Merton (1974) conceptualisation of debt pricing is at the
core of some businesses who produce and market default proba-
bilities, e.g. Moody’s KMV. This approach is also considered to be
a viable practice in meeting bank capital regulations. Nevertheless,
Merton (1974) is by no means exhaustive and others have extended
it to include more realistic features such as possible default before
maturity, incomplete information about a firm’s liabilities, etc.
These extensions are primarily devoted to pricing and do not
present systematic evaluations of the links between APDs and
RNPDs.
States at date T s Z 1 s Z 2 s Z 3
Actual probabilities p(1) Z 0.7 p(2) Z 0.2 p(3) Z 0.1
Future payoffs
Riskfree bond 1 1 1
Risky bond A 1 1 0.6
Risky bond B 1 0.6 1
Clearly, bond A and B have APDs of pd,a Z p(3) Z 0.1 and
pd,B Z p(2) Z 0.2 respectively.
142 S. MurthyMerton (1974, page 459) himself points out, his framework
does not directly take into account factors such as the
correlations of an issuer’s assets with other assets in the
economy which would influence the betas of a firm and its
debt. Hence, we submit, it is of interest to examine
whether other frameworks can shed light on understanding
differences between RNPDs and APDs.
Hund (2003) explicitly examines the volatility properties
of RNPDs in a Merton model but does not discuss any
differences between RNPDs and APDs. Berg (2010) shows
that, in a Merton framework, credit risk premia are
a significant part of model spreads and their importance
relative to expected losses increases as credit quality
improves; i.e. RNPD-to-APD ratios increase as actual
default probabilities fall. However, Berg does not offer any
economic reason or intuition for why his result obtains
other than suggesting that it has to do with the betas of
bonds. This leaves unanswered questions of whether the
result is particular to the general Merton framework and its
ingredients such as the assumption of continuous trading.
Our approach is different from the papers cited above in
that it focuses on the roles of investor risk aversion and
multiple risky investment alternatives in the pricing of
credit risk within a state-preference setting.7 We argue
that risk premia due to systematic risk factors explain the
cross-sectional differences in RNPDs and APDs. Further-
more, the empirical result on the RNPD-to-APD ratio from
Hull et al. (2005) is exactly what one would expect to hold
for the average asset based on economic intuition relating
to systematic risk. Thus, rationalisation of this observed
regularity is robust to alternative model specifications vis-
a-vis Merton (1974). However, unlike Berg (2010) where all
issuers are restricted to have the same correlation with an
investor’s pricing benchmark (such as the market portfolio
in the CAPM), a sub-investment grade issue can have
a higher risk premium per unit expected loss than an
investment grade bond; i.e. the RNPD-APD ratio need not
be decreasing in the APD for all securities. Our approach is
quite similar to that of Coval et al. (2008) but we differ in
our objective of explaining the RNPD-APD relationship for
bonds whereas they focus on structured products. (A
further discussion of their paper is contained in the section
‘RNPD/APD ratios and systematic risks in the cross-section
of bonds’) We also show that bonds with high ratios are
shown to be most sensitive to news. Finally, we believe that
our paper illustrates the need for nuanced interpretation of
market-implied probabilities given the impossibility of
model-free constructions. This point is important in a policy
context given recent calls to supplement (or even do away
with) ratings issued by agencies in favour of ‘market-
implied ratings’ (see Flannery, Houston, and Partnoy
(2010).7 This framework, due to Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959),
underpins virtually all subsequent results on risk and return in
financial economics. In using it, and by eschewing the complicated
mathematical apparatus of modern derivatives valuation, we are
able to provide refinements to intuition about qualitative effects
but, unlike the typical structural and reduced form models, have to
stop short of providing quantitative detail to the degree needed for
pricing or trading.The next section sets out the basic issues and shows the
na€ıve affine relationship between RNPDs and APDs. An inves-
tor’s optimisationproblem is considered in the third section so
as to draw explicit links to systematic risk. The fourth section
offers further discussion, after which we conclude.
A basic framework and the issues
Consider assets that payoff at a future date T and are
valued at an initial date 0. They include a default-free bond
as well as risky bonds, all of which mature at date T with
promised maturity payments of 1 each (in dollars, for ease).
If a risky bond j defaults it pays Rj < 1, an assumed known
recovery per unit promised payment. Uncertainty about the
payoffs of all assets is captured by supposing there are
alternative states of the world, {s}, of which one will come
to prevail at date T.
Investors’ beliefs about future uncertainty are repre-
sented by a probability measure P that assigns positive
probabilities {p(s)} to the states {s}. These are termed
‘actual’ probabilities since they refer to measures of the
physical frequencies of occurrence of the states. The set of
states in which an individual bond j defaults is denoted dj
with corresponding actual default probability pd,j; the
complementary set in which no-default occurs is nj. A
simple illustrative numerical example now follows.
Example 1. Let T Z 1 year, and suppose there are only 3
states with probabilities as shown. There is 1 riskfree and 2
risky zero coupon bonds with payoffs across states as
shown. Both risky bonds j pay Rj Z 0.6 when in default.Note that in Example 1 each bond satisfies a binomial-
type representation familiar from option pricing models.
However, the above also represents the risky bonds jointly;
it involves an assumption on the correlation of their
defaults.
Market-implied risk-neutral probabilities and no-
arbitrage
The price B0,j of risky bond j must equal its expected future
payoff discounted at a risk-adjusted rate given by the





1þ rf þ lj ð1Þ
Market-implied risk-neutral probabilities 143Using the yield yjh1=B0;j  1 and the possible loss 1Rj from
default, (1) is equivalent to a yield spread for the bond of
y rfZlþ pdð1 RÞ
B0
: ð2Þ
i.e. a bond holder is compensated with a risk premium in
addition to the actual expected loss (rate) on his invest-
ment of B0,j. Given an observed bond price (which neces-
sarily satisfies (1) above), one can determine the value of






1þ rf : ð3Þ
This is equivalent to expressing the bond’s yield spread




computed with a new probability qd,j. If qdjZ½1 B0;j
ð1þ rfÞ=ð1 RjÞ, the solution, is positive and less than 1
then, as per our discussion in the Introduction, it is the RNPD
for bond j. For this to be true, the risky bond’s market price
must be less (more) than a default-free counterpart with
maturity payment of 1 (respectively, of Rj), abstracting from
frictions such as short sale constraints, brokerage fees, taxes,
etc. Otherwise, one could earn riskless arbitrage profits and
the market-implied probabilities would take absurd values.
Hence, in order for implied probabilities to have any merit,
we assume all assets trade with no-arbitrage opportunities
possible as in the following illustrative example.
Example 2. Consider Example 1 and suppose we are given
observed current (date 0) prices for bonds A and B of 0.8
and 0.727 (or 8/11), respectively, with the default-free
bond selling at a riskfree rate of 10%. The RNPDs implied
by these prices as per (3) are qd,A Z 0.3 and qd,B Z 0.5.
8
The ‘credit spread puzzle’
Hull, Pedrescu & White (2005) present data that they term
the Credit Spread Puzzle. Using default rates published by
Moody’s for the period 1970e2003, they estimate actual
default intensities for 7-year corporate debt. These annual-
ised default intensities ‘h’ are converted to our annual APDs
as per pdZ 1  eh. Using market data (Merrill Lynch bond
indexes for 1969e2004) on corporate debt of 6.5e8.9 year
maturity for the period 1996e2004, and an assumed recovery
rate RZ 0.4, Hull et al. (2005) also infer risk-neutral inten-
sities from observed yield spreads y rfwhich are converted
to our RNPDs similar to our APDs. 9 Table 1 reports these APDs8 Using qd;Ahqð3Þ; qd;BZqð2Þ; and
P
s qðsÞZ1, these also imply
that the risk-neutral probabilities of the individual states 1, 2 and 3
are Z 0.2, 0.5 and 0.3 respectively.
9 Rather than the yield on comparable maturity Treasuries, Hull
et al. (2005) use the 7-year swap rate less 10 bps as their riskfree
benchmark (which averaged 43 basis points in excess of the Trea-
sury yield in their sample) in line with market norms. This may also
correct for non-default risk components in spreads such as those
due to tax treatment and illiquidity.and RNPDs adapted from the Hull data. Also shown in the
table (in basis points) are the actual expected losses pd,j
(1  R) and the risk premium lzðqd  pdÞð1 RÞ that come
from the approximate versions of (2) and (4).
Hull et al. (2005) refers to the magnitude of the differ-
ences between the RNPDs and the APDs as the Credit
Spread Puzzle. They, and others, focus on the differences
in levels averaged across ratings classes and point to posi-
tive risk premia as explaining RNPDs greater than APDs (and
thus ratios above 1). Also note that within each rating class,
the Hull et al. (2005) data pertains to bond indexes or
averages across bonds. However, as is clear from Table 1,
the difference in the levels and the ratio of the two prob-
abilities differ dramatically across bond ratings, and the
relationship between the two is highly non-linear.10 This
prompts the question: Why are investment grade bond
indexes so different from speculative grade bonds indexes
in this respect?
Now consider another example that builds on, and yet
differs from, the earlier Example 2. The latter featured two
bonds with RNPD-to-APD behaviour qualitatively similar to
that seen in Table 1. Bond A in Example 2 has an APD of 10%
and an RNPD/APD ratio of 3 while the ‘lower rated ‘ bond B
has an APD of 20% and an RNPD/APD ratio of only 2.5.
Example 3. Consider Examples 1& 2 and suppose that, in
addition, we are given a new bond C whose observed
current (date 0) price is 0.618 (or 34/55) and whose
future payoffs are 1 in state 1, and 0.6 in states 2 and 3.
i.e. bond C defaults in states 2 and 3, and its APD is 30%.
As in Example 2 (and footnote 9), its RNPD can be
calculated to be 0.8. The resulting RNPD/APD ratio for C
is 2.67, and this bond is clearly at odds with the data
shown in Table 1.
The new bond here has a higher APD relative to the ‘old’
bonds of Examples 1&2and, yet, has ahigher RNPD/APD ratio
than one of the old ones. Thus, one ought to ask: how general
or pervasive is the phenomenon depicted in Table 1? Alter-
natively, is there anything perverse about Example 3 which
(despite relying only on the absence of arbitrage) appears to
capture a case where the RNPD/APD ratio is not necessarily
uniformly declining across bonds of different APDs?
Prior work does not address reasons why (and when) the
ratio may be decreasing in the bond rating. However, Hull
et al. (2005) do point out that differing betas, i.e. risk
premia, across ratings may play a role e and before we
explore this theme further, we point to a useful interpre-
tation in terms of welfare costs.1110 If we did not annualise our probabilities and use their cumu-
lative counterparts over an assumed 7-year maturity,nothing of
substance changes in Table 1. The key object of interest, the
RNPD/APD ratio, would vary between 1.1 and 16.4 as ratings
improve with an average of 6.8.
11 See Altman (1989), Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001),
Bakshi, Madan, and Zhang (2006), and Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and
Goldstein (2009) for more empirical results on the significance of
actual default probabilities (or expected losses) relative to bond
spreads.
Table 1 Risk-neutral and actual default probabilities.
Rating APD RNPD Actual expected loss Risk premium RNPD/APD RNPD-APD
Aaa 4 67 2 38 16.7 63
Aa 6 78 4 43 13.0 72
A 13 127 8 69 9.8 114
Baa 47 235 28 113 5.0 188
Ba 237 494 142 154 2.1 257
B 722 863 433 85 1.2 141
Caa & Lower 1555 1918 933 218 1.2 364
Average 369 540 221 103 7.0 171
All numbers except for the RNPD/APD ratio are stated in basis points. The APDs are adapted from Hull et al. (2005) using the trans-
formation pdZ 1ee
h given its real-world annualised default intensity h (and similarly for the RNPDs). Also shown are the (approximate)
actual expected losses pd,j (1  R) and the (approximate) risk premium lzðqd  pdÞð1 RÞ.
12 To see this, rewrite (5) as qd;j  pd;jZajð1 pd;jÞZljð1 pd;jÞ=
½ð1 RjÞð1þ rf þ ljÞ.
13 A test of this hypothesis would involve investigating market
reactions to revisions in explicit announcements (by KMV, for
instance) of new real-world default probabilities while holding loss
given default or recovery fixed.
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Since bond j pays only a fraction Rj of its face value when
default occurs, investors face a possible loss of 1  Rj.
Consider insurance that makes good this loss (i.e. pays
1  Rj) when default occurs. It involves no up-front cost but
requires later payment of a known premium qj at bond
maturity whether or not default occurs. This insurance
policy is just a Credit Default Swap (CDS) and the premium
qj is the ‘CDS spread’. An investor who buys 1 unit of risky
bond j can, with no additional current out-of-pocket
investment, enter into such a CDS or insurance contract
and lock in a future riskfree payoff of 1  qj whether the
bond defaults or not. Thus, the bond price B0,j and the fair
value of the insurance premium must be jointly determined
in the market such that strategy’s cost B0,j equal
ð1 qjÞ=ð1þ rfÞ. Using (3), with this no-arbitrage restric-
tion now gives qd;jZqj=ð1 RÞ. Thus, the RNPD of a bond is
just the cost per unit coverage of insurance against default
and the RNPD/APD ratio qd;j=pd;j is, correspondingly, the
cost qj=½pd;jð1 RÞ per unit expected loss or coverage.
Thus, the data in Table 1 implies that insurance coverage of
$100 million can be obtained with Aaa-rated bonds at a cost
of 67 basis points per dollar or $670,000. However, the
same coverage against default of Ba-rated bonds would
cost $4.94 million e only about 7.5 times as much as the
cost for the Aaa’s despite being 60 times as likely to
default. In other words, the ratio of the two probabilities
has the direct connotation of capturing costs of insurance
and it implies that the striking cross-sectional relative
behaviour of the two probabilities is linked to investors’
welfare across different types of default events.
A basic identity and conjectures about the two sets
of probabilities
From (1) and (3), we may link the risk-neutral probability of










1þ rf þ lj
 ð5Þ
where the coefficients aj and bj are determined by the risk
premium lj, recovery rate Rj and riskfree rate rf. Note that
(5) is a simple affine form with aj > 0 if and only if lj > 0while bj is always positive (since positive bond prices ensure
1 þ rf þ lj > 0). It illustrates possible intuitions about the
links between the two probabilities. We now enumerate
a few such conjectures using the first partial derivatives of
qd,j with respect to its arguments and examine its explan-
atory power for the Hull et al. (2005) data.
First, an RNPD qd,j will exceed its APD counterpart pd,j if
and only if the associated risk premium lj is positive.
12 As
we will see in section 3, this intuition is correct in that it
holds unambiguously assuming only the absence of arbi-
trage. Most RNPDs do in fact typically exceed APDs as evi-
denced by the data in Table 1 on portfolios or indexes of
bonds within each rating group. Whether credit-sensitive
claims to negative beta payoffs command lower RNPDs
than their APDs has not, to our knowledge, been tested
empirically.
Secondly, note that the first partial derivative of qd,j
with respect to pd,j is positive for all bonds since bj > 0.
This is consistent with the tendency of market observers to
attribute changes in the observed RNPD solely to changes in
the underlying APD as a cause. But since this partial
derivative effect treats other determinants as fixed, it
follows that an increase in one probability is not necessarily
accompanied by an increase in the other. Only in a rela-
tively benign market environment (viz. ‘normal times’)
where a change in an individual bond’s APD is small and its
impact on the risk premium is of second-order magnitude,
would changes in one be mirrored by changes of the same
sign in the other probability with a unit elasticity – ration-
alising a commonplace intuition.13
Third, the partial derivative of qd,j with respect to lj is
positive and yields the conjecture that increases
(decreases) in the required risk premium will increase
(respectively, decrease) the RNPD, holding fixed the APD.
This intuition is consistent with an increase in investor risk
aversion resulting in a lower (higher) price of positive
(negative) beta bonds – by leading to a higher market price
of risk and increasing the absolute value of the risk
Market-implied risk-neutral probabilities 145premium. Furthermore, a resultant lower (higher) bond
price that accompanies a change in its risk premium can,
under the hypothetical assumption of risk-neutrality, only
be explained by an increase in qd,j.
Fourth, the partial derivative of qd,j with respect to rf
shows that qd,j is decreasing in the riskfree rate if and only
if the risk premium lj is positive.
14 This claim is interesting
in that, for the typical case where the risk premium is
positive, it is consistent with Longstaff and Schwartz
(1995)’s theoretical and empirical claims (and those of
others) but is arrived at using a different argument and
simpler exposition. However, with both this effect and the
last one pertaining to changes in the risk premium, caution
is advised since changes in the riskfree rate and risk premia
are not always independent of each other (which is effec-
tively an assumption implicit in Longstaff and Schwartz) e
as when there is an increase in investors’ risk aversion.
A last conjecture that can be drawn from the relation-
ship (5) pertains to the effects of a change in the recovery
rate Rj. The partial derivative in (5) of qd,j with respect to
Rj is positive e suggesting that good news about the pros-
pects for salvaging the assets of an issuer who may default
will result in an increase in the market-implied RNPD! This
implausible, purported effect highlights the limited use of
working with the relationship (5). It ignores the possibility
of the risk premium lj, and thereby also the RNPD qd,j,
coming down when Rj is higher because the bond may be
less risky in terms of future payouts. Ignoring the endoge-
nous nature of the risk premium lj in (5) would lead to other
absurdities: note that qd,j will not equal pd,jwhen the latter
is 0 or 1. This last fact clearly points to the non-linearity of
the true relationship between the two probabilities.
In summary, while the relationship or identity (5) is
useful at a broad level it must be interpreted with care and
is likely to be of limited use in cross-sectional or time-series
comparisons when there is significant variation in any of the
variables involved. A complete assessment would require
a treatment of risk aversion and opportunity costs that
drive risk premia.
An investor’s optimisation
In order to highlight the determinants of risk premia and
their effects on risk-neutral probabilities we now consider
a typical investor’s portfolio optimisation.
Consider the framework of the second section over dates
0 and T with multiple risky assets j Z 1,.,N of which at
least one is a default-sensitive bond; there is also a default-
free bond with riskless interest rate rf. Bond j’s payoff BT,j
(s) is either 1 in states s˛nj that form the no-default event
nj or Rj < 1 in states comprising the default event dj.
15 The
payoffs and current price B0,j give the risky returns {rj(s)}:
B0;jð1þ rjðsÞÞhBT;jðsÞ.14 This partial here is lj½pd;jð1 RjÞ  1=ð1 RjÞð1þ rf þ ljÞ2. The
Longstaff-Schwartz argument is based on the usual comparative
static exercise that holds current firm value fixed and concludes
that a higher rf raises the risk-neutral drift of future asset value
and thus lowers the RNPD.
15 For simplicity, we use the index j to refer to both a typical bond
and an arbitrary asset.An investor’s initial wealth, set at 1 for simplicity, is allo-
cated across the risky assets according to chosen portfolio
weights x Z {xj} with a position in the riskfree asset of
1 Pjxj. The resulting wealth at date T varies across states

















His attitudes towards risk are described by a utility function
u(.) over wealth that is strictly increasing, strictly concave,
and differentiable. That is the investor prefers more wealth
to less and is risk-averse. The investor chooses a portfolio x
to maximise his expected utility of wealth defined, relative





Let x* be his optimal portfolio; the necessary (and suffi-
cient) condition for optimality is
Ep

u0ðWðx)ÞÞrj  rfZ0 ð6Þ
where u0ðWðs; x)ÞÞ is the marginal utility derived from an
extra unit of wealth in state s given the chosen optimal
portfolio x*.16 Condition (6) can be used to solve for optimal
portfolios. Alternatively, given an optimal portfolio or
associated wealth across states, (6) can be used to deter-
mine the price or RNPD of a risky bond in terms of risk
aversion and opportunity costs arising from available
returns from other assets.
A fundamental relationship
One can rewrite (6) for bond j, grouping states into default











pðsÞhpd;j is the APD of bond j. A compar-
ison of (7) with the usual risk-neutral valuation expression
(1) then yields a fundamental relationship between (and
defines) the risk-neutral probability measure QhfqðsÞg in
terms of the actual probability measure PhfpðsÞg. An
individual state s’s risk-neutral probability q(s) scales its
actual probability p(s) according to:
qðsÞZpðsÞu0ðWðs;x)ÞÞ=Ep½u0ðWðx)ÞÞ: ð8Þ
Inwords, a risk-neutral probability for any state s is a product
of bothhow likely the state is in termsof its actual probability
and a scaling factor hðsÞhu0ðWðs; x)ÞÞ=Ep½u0ðWðx)ÞÞwhich is
just the marginal utility in that state relative to its average
value. The latter factor takes different values across states
and is accordingly termed a stochastic discount factor or
pricing kernel in modern asset pricing theory (and the
RadoneNikodym derivative of the two measures P and Q in16 We have assumed a frictionless setting here. Also, all required
mathematical niceties such as the existence of an optimum have
been implicitly assumed to hold.
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states are characterised by low (high) wealth and have
h (s) > 1 (respectively, <1) and the implications for default
probabilities will be explained shortly.
Adding the risk-neutral probabilities over relevant states




qðsÞ. Now, the relationship between the two PDs







To interpret and gain insight into (9), we proceed by
examining several special cases.17
RNPD/APD ratios and systematic risks in the cross-
section of bonds
Consider a default-prone bond j, but drop all bond j-
specific indexes below (unless otherwise mentioned), and
take its default event d to correspond to a single state for
simplicity. The investor has chosen his optimal portfolio.
The associated wealth in d is denoted W(d ) with marginal
utility u0ðWðdÞÞ. Thus, the numerator of (9), is then just
pdu
0ðWðdÞÞ. The investor’s portfolio’s terminal value and
wealthW (s) will in general differ across the multiple states
ssd in which bond j does not default with correspondingly
different marginal utilities u0ðWðsÞÞ. The expected marginal
utility conditional on no-default Ep½u0ðWTðx)ÞÞjn is some




u0ðWðsÞÞ. Hence the denominator of (9) becomes
pdu
0ðWðdÞÞ þ ð1 pdÞj.18 Thus, the bond’s RNPD from (9) is
qdZ
pdu0ðWðdÞÞ
pdu0ðWðdÞÞ þ ð1 pdÞj: ð10Þ
With this relationship e a ratio of two linear functions –
a number of results now follow which are contained in the
rest of the third section. It is useful to compare them with
those stemming from the na€ıve relationship of the second
section.
First, qd is positive and less than 1 if and only if the same
is true of pd because marginal utilities are positive. Also, qd
is 0 or 1 when pd is 0 or 1, respectively.
Next, the RNPD is the APD scaled up or down by a factor
that compares u0ðWðdÞÞ with pdu0ðWðdÞÞ þ ð1 pdÞj
thereby capturing attributes of the particular bond and
consequences of its default. Both terms also depend on the
investor’s risk aversion, measured through u0ð:Þ, and his
overall portfolio’s performance across possible macroeco-
nomic states as measured by actual probability beliefs and
the associated asset returns implicit in W (d ) and j.
Specifically, the RNPD-to-APD ratio compares the expected
reduction in utility, u0ðWðdÞÞ, per $1 loss from the17 Wirh the stochastic discount factor here given by
mðsÞZu0ðWðs; x)ÞÞ=Ep½uðWðx)ÞÞ; Eq. (8) becomes qðsÞ=pðsÞZmðsÞ.
Eq. (9) is a conditional version of (8), given the event that bond j
defaults.
18 Using the definition of a conditional expectation,
Ep½uðWTðx)ÞÞZpdE½u0ðWTðx)ÞÞjd þ ð1 pdÞE½u0ðWTðx)ÞÞjn where
d and n are the default and no-default events of the bond.bond’s default to the expected decrease in utility
pdu
0ðWðdÞÞ þ ð1 pdÞj arising from a sure loss of $1 from
future wealth. An explanation of this comparison now
follows.
Since the investor is risk-averse, his marginal utility is
higher the lower his wealth. Suppose the investor is rela-
tively poor in the state where the bond defaults in the
sense that u0ðWðdÞÞ > j, i.e. W (d ) is sufficiently low
relative to wealth W (s) in non-default states s s d. Then
the value or welfare loss suffered per $1 loss due to default
exceeds the average value pdu
0ðWðdÞÞ þ ð1 pdÞj, and the
larger this excess the more default will hurt him. Thus, ex
ante, he penalises such a bond more than what consider-
ation of solely its odds of default would suggest. Conse-
quently, its lower price is reflected in an RNPD qd that will
exceed its APD pd.
It is also useful to consider the risk premium of the bond.
Combining the basic identity (5) with (10), the risk premium







pdu0ðWðdÞÞ þ ð1 pdÞj ð11Þ
Thus, the risk premium is positive or negative according to
whether the bond’s default is in a state where u0ðWðdÞÞ
exceeds or falls short of j. Accordingly, we may say that
such a bond has a positive ‘beta’: it pays when his wealth is
high and defaults when his wealth is low.19
Nothing precludes an individual bond from having an
RNPD less than its APD. Suppose, in contrast to our earlier
assumption, the bond’s default event occurs when the
investor is relatively rich (where his overall portfolio does
well) in the sense that u0ðWðdÞÞ < j, i.e. W (d ) is suffi-
ciently high relative to wealth W (s)in non-default states
s s d. This would be the case for the debt of a negative
beta business which is more likely to not pay in good
macroeconomic times than bad ones. Using the same logic
as earlier, we may conclude that for this bond qd < pd.
Similarly, Example 3’s bond C is not perverse relative to B
since it also defaults in state 3 whose q-to-p ratio is high,
i.e. when an extra dollar in wealth has larger marginal
utility value than average.
A bond whose default is independent of an investor’s
portfolio can be treated similarly. A necessary condition for
this is that the bond’s prospects are independent of the
returns of other assets held and the investor’s exposure to it is
a small fraction of his portfolio, i.e. he diversifies its risk with
positions in other similar assets. Then his wealth when the
bonddefaults is not expected to be any different fromwhen it
does not default. Under such circumstances, the default
event is uncorrelated with his marginal utility of wealth and
the bond has a zero beta. Then, from (10), u0ðWðdÞÞZj and
hence qdZ pd. The classic example of this is insurance that
pays contingent on a risk that can be eliminated when
aggregated over a large number of policy-holders. Risks of this19 To see this formally, write the conditional expectation
Ep½u0ðWðx)ÞÞjdj as Ep½u0ðWðx)ÞÞ less the covariance with
u0ðWðx)ÞÞ of an indicator random variable defined relative to the
default event. These are not the usual CAPM betas but generalised
versions representing the covariance of the bond’s payoff with the
investor’s portfolio expressed in marginal utility terms.
20 The treatment here, implicitly, examines a dynamic version of
the static framework of the earlier sections. It underscores the
point that the essential results and intuition are unchanged. We do
not formally adopt a full-blown dynamic treatment in the interests
of simplicity.
21 Use p^ðsÞZpðsÞ½ð1 p^dÞ=ð1 pdÞ to verify that Ep½u0ðWTðx)ÞÞ
jnZj. It follows that Ep½u0ðWTðx)ÞÞ becomes p^du0ðWðdÞÞþ
ð1 p^dÞj. Analysis of the case where the bad news also lowers the
recovery rate R can be done similarly.
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line with actuarial odds. Obviously, most assets’ returns carry
exposure to macroeconomic or systematic factors and hence
their risks are not completely diversifiable.
Third, differentiating the RNPD in (10) with respect to
the APD pd one can verify that the higher the APD the larger
is the RNPD (for both positive and negative beta bonds).
Fourth, differentiation a second time, shows that qd is
concave (convex) in pd and this implies that bonds’ RNPD/
APD ratios gradually decrease (increase) to 1 as the actual
probability of default increases provided qd > pd (respec-
tively, qd < pd). Equivalently, as can be seen by differen-
tiating (11), the risk premium to actual expected loss ratio
comes down as the APD increases if and only if the bond has
a positive beta. This generalises the Berg (2010) result e
which considered only securities with positive betas e from
a Merton (1974) framework to a very basic setting and thus
demonstrates its robustness. It simultaneously shows that
the role of the bond’s risk premium or beta is crucial.
In summary, Eq. (9) says that the RNPD qd,j of an indi-
vidual bond j is a scaled up or down version of its APD pd,j.
The relevant scaling factor here is just a conditional
version, Ep½u0ðWTðx)ÞÞjdj=Ep½u0ðWTðx)ÞÞ, specific to bond j
of the earlier scaling factor or pricing density h of (8).




ðWðs; x)ÞÞ=pd;j is the investor’s expected marginal utility
conditional on default of bond j and is a measure of the
bond’s systematic risk. Thus, the behaviour of the ratio
qd;j=pd;j of the RNPD to the APD varies in the cross-section
of bonds j Z 1,.,N according to how any two bonds j
and k differ in the relative magnitudes of Ep½u0ðWT ðx)ÞÞ
jdjand Ep½u0ðWTðx)ÞÞjdk. Some bonds’ default events will
have a high covariance with the investor’s marginal utility
across states and high betas while others will have low
betas. Accordingly, the ratio of the PDs for the former will
exceed that for the latter.
This explains the data in Table 1 which pertains to bond
indexes. i.e. they represent the average bond in a given
ratings class. The fact that the ratio exceeds 1 can be
explained by arguing that the average bond in any ratings
class most plausibly has a positive ‘beta’. Our explanation
also implies however that the RNPD can well be less than an
APD for some individual bonds since systematic risks can
and do differ across individual securities. If the creditwor-
thiness of the issuer is negatively correlated with the
overall macroeconomy, and thus with investor’s portfolios,
the default of such a bond hurts less since its default event
is likely to occur when the investor’s portfolio is, for other
reasons, doing well.
A similar explanation underlies the behaviour of struc-
tured products created as claims on pools of individual
bonds e only the quantitative effect would be even
stronger. Coval et al. (2008) show that high values of the
RNPD/APD ratio extend beyond indexes of corporate bonds
to market prices of structured products such as tranches of
CDOs written on similar indexes. Furthermore, consistent
with the systematic risk explanation, the non-linear pattern
discussed in this paper is stronger in their paper for CDOs:
tranches with APDs comparable to AAA-rated bond com-
manded RNPD/APD ratios of between 18 and 60 as opposed
to Table 1’s number of 17 during the years immediatelybefore and during the crisis. This huge difference can be
explained by noting that the numbers in Table 1 refer to
a pro-rata share in a pool (i.e. index) whereas CDOs allo-
cate losses according to a priority rule and thus their senior
tranches are even more sensitive to systematic risk than
the underlying pool (or bond index). Taking note of the
qualitative similarity between bonds (our paper) and
structured products (Coval et al) in the non-linear patterns
in their RNPD/APD ratios supports the view that CDO
investors did not pay attention to low APDs alone but were
(at least partially) correct in seeing senior tranches as
carrying large systematic risk exposure despite their low
APDs. However, Coval et al argue tranches were never-
theless still overvalued in the CDO market. Conditional on
the assumption that the relevant systematic risk can be
proxied by covariances relative to the S&P 500, they show
the ratios seen in the market were too small relative to the
prices of hypothetical put options securities created with
similar payoffs similar to CDO tranches.
The impact of news
The analysis above can be readily used to explain how an
RNPD should change when there is a news event that is
particular to a single bond. i.e. it allows one to evaluate the
frequent criticism made by ratings agencies of market-
implied probabilities, viz. that they are excessively volatile.
We saw in the section ‘A basic identity and conjectures
about the two sets of probabilities’, working with the basic
identity (5), that an increase in APD leads to a higher RNPD
for all bonds regardless of their beta, i.e. whichever of the
two probabilities exceeded the other. But we also pointed
out that (5) was only a rudimentary relationship and the
claimed effect used an assumption that an increase in APD
would have no effect on the bond’s risk premium. With the
benefit of the richer relationship (9) that endogeneises
effects on the risk premium, we now see that the claim
made in the second section is unambiguously true e but
with an interesting twist. Consider the investor and bond of
the sub-section ‘A fundamental relationship’ when actual
probabilities are {p (s)} prior to a news event. Suppose the
news event is a ‘bad’ one that increases the actual prob-
ability pd of the state in which bond j defaults to p^d.
20
Further, suppose the news event is an ‘own’ one: it does
not affect the relative probabilities of other states but
simply re-scales them to their new sum which equals the
lower probability of no-default 1 p^d of bond j. Such news
does not change the marginal utility u0ðWðdÞÞ in the default
state. Hence, it should be clear on inspection that the
expected marginal utility conditional on no-default also
retains its prior value of j.21 It follows that the revised
22 After a successful history as an independent business,
competing with ratings agencies, KMV was acquired by Moody’s and
is now known as Moody’s KMV. To all appearances, Moody’s KMV
makes heavy use of recent past returns of a firm’s assets, as
implied by its equity performance in formulating this return on
assets.
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same form as in (10) above with p^d replacing pd. Thus, such
news that impacts only the bond’s PD - and does not impact
its recovery rate or the APDs of other bonds or returns of
other assets e can be evaluated as per our earlier discus-
sion in the previous sub-section (RNPD/APD ratios and
systematic risks in the cross-section of bonds).
It follows from the first partial derivative of qd with
respect to pd discussed earlier that an increase in APD from
pd to p^d results in an increase in RNPD if and only if the
bond has a positive beta. The numbers in Table 1 may be
used as illustration. Consider the typical bond which has
RNPD/APD > 1 (i.e. a positive beta bond). A given increase
in the APD of 15 bps, say, from 1.5% to 1.65%, is accom-
panied by a larger increase in the RNPD of 75 bps, say, from
15% to 15.75%. (Clearly, from Table 1, at a low enough
initial level of APD, the RNPD/APD ratio is 5). So in this
sense the ratings agencies criticism has merit e the market-
implied counterpart is ‘excessively’ volatile at low APD
levels. However, reaction by the market gets progressively
muted for every successive increase in the APD until a point
where further worsening of actual default prospects are not
matched to an equal degree by the market.
A further point of interest comes from noting that
investment grade bonds have, on average, large values of
the ratio relative to speculative grade bonds in Table 1.
Thus, the sensitivity of RNPDs (i.e. spreads) to news is
greatest for the ‘safest’ bonds and lower rated bonds’
RNPDs should be less volatile than their APDs. This may
be understood from the second partial derivative of qd
with respect to pd which is negative under the same
condition that beta > 0 or the RNPD/APD ratio > 1. Thus,
the impact on qd of bad news about pd is strictly
increasing and in a strictly concave manner for such
bonds. In words, the marginal impact of an increase in pd
on qd is greatest when the APD is lowest (and the bond
beta is positive). We have shown that this may be
understood along the lines that bad news about a bond is
more serious the safer the bond was thought to have
been.
Further discussion
What’s special about credit?
A pertinent question is what, if anything, is special about
risky bonds or credit derivatives vis-a-vis distinctions
between the actual and risk-neutral probabilities? After all,
risk premia exist everywhere and consequently the two
probabilities must in general differ. Thus, if distinctions
between risk-neutral and actual probabilities can be
ignored in other markets perhaps they can be glossed over
in credit markets too.
Credit securities present an interesting case because of
the predominantly binary or discrete characteristics
attached to key underlying or trigger events. For instance,
a risky bond or loan will either default or not do so, and
a debt covenant will either be breached or satisfied.
Furthermore, regulatory or prudential restrictions on
a money manager’s portfolio choices often hinge on events
with discrete outcomes like ratings changes, and are thusrelevant to all credit investors. Bank capital regulations
are often prescribed with reference to actual probabili-
ties. A firm’s cost of capital is influenced by its rating. And
so on. When pre-specified discrete events are material to
an investor or a security, it is natural to attach importance
to actual probabilities of these events. Furthermore, it is
typically assumed in practice that a bond’s payoff in the
default event is a known (as a first order approximation)
fraction, say 40%, of its full or promised payment. By
assuming away the uncertainty associated with the actual
payment that an investor may recover from a defaulted
bond, attention then devolves on the easier task of
assessing the probability of default, per se, rather than
the relevant moment (probability times the payoff or the
loss). To this extent, credit securities differ from other
assets such as stocks or options where one can’t dispense
with the need to consider moments. These characteristics
of credit securities also explain why there is widespread
production of information tied to actual default probabil-
ities such as ratings put out by agencies such as Standard
& Poor’s and Moody’s.
Why risk-neutrality?
But why risk-neutral implied probabilities? Why not seek
to construct market-implied probabilities taking investor
risk aversion or risk premia into account? Is the latter
task even feasible?
Our earlier simple formulation in Eq. (1) illustrates that
an observed bond price (or yield) can be used to estimate
a market-implied APD provided one takes a ‘view’ on the
bond’s risk premium l. Consistent with this approach,
Moody’s KMV, a business founded on the Merton con-
ceptualisation of debt, sells APDs that make use of market
prices. Using a firm’s stock prices they derive RNPDs for
corporate debt as per the Merton logic. In the next crucial
step, they use a proprietary database of past history on the
RNPD-APD relationship to map an RNPD to its corresponding
APD. It is difficult to see how this is not, at least in part,
equivalent to making an assumption about the expected
future return of the firm’s assets based on past data. Efforts
to replicate KMV’s approach make direct assumptions of
this sort which are effectively assumptions about the firm’s
risk premium from which, in the Merton framework, that of
debt follows.22
Our earlier remarks point to the role of risk premia and
how they are driven by investors’ risk aversion, the likely
returns on other securities available, and the current values
of their portfolios. Other features of their circumstances
such as any future liabilities, ability to short sell, regula-
tion, etc also matter. None of these characteristics is
perfectly observable and hence must be estimated.
Furthermore, these may change with time and the macro-
economic environment. While the theory of asset pricing
Market-implied risk-neutral probabilities 149provides guidance in order to conduct inferences along
these lines, it should be clear that this is a delicate task.
This explains one reason why market-implied risk-
neutral probabilities are popular e they are easy to
construct, and with proper awareness, can be used in
a discriminate manner. A further reason is simply that most
credit risk valuation models are based on the risk-neutral
methodology first developed in the context of option
pricing. Their objective is that of determining the price of
a candidate security in terms of given market prices of
other assets (and assumed characteristics of the future
stochastic evolution of the latters’ prices). Importantly,
these models make no direct use of, and thus have no
transparent role for, actual probabilities.23 Note that this
does not do away with the need for actual probability
estimates. ‘Active’ real-world investment decisions involve
views about future likely scenarios and their effects on
returns. For instance, an investor taking a short-term
position today by buying a distant maturity corporate
bond will almost certainly find it useful to assess the posi-
tion’s expected return (and volatility) over the near term e
based on actual probabilities.
Policy relevance
As noted in the Introduction, the use of market prices to
draw inferences has been used at all times, arguably, in the
history of financial markets. All such efforts are (at least
implicitly) based on specific models such a Fisherian
hypothesis with interest rates, or the Gordon dividend
discount model with stocks, or the Black and Scholes (1973)
model with implied stock volatilities. As argued earlier, it is
impossible to construct any ‘model-free’ expectations from
market prices. Going by the voluminous commentary based
on such signals, however, many appear to be insufficiently
appreciative of the foundations of such approaches. Thus,
it is very important to be circumspect about arguments for
market-implied ratings such as those from Flannery et al.
(2010).
Empirical implications and further work
One result of ours implies that systematic risk is less
important for high-yield bonds relative to investment grade
bonds after accounting for the larger APDs of the former.
This is consistent with Cornell and Green (1991) and Fama
and French (1993) estimates of betas of bonds across
different ratings. Their results suggest that the beta of a Ba
bond is about two-to-five times as large as that of an Aaa
despite its actual default probability being 60 times larger.
We also argued that bonds with low APDs should, on
average, be more sensitive to macro news. Evidence
consistent with this view is found in CDS spreads for23 Relationships between risk-neutral and actual probabilities
are, effectively, subsumed in such models to the extent that they
treat actual expected returns. However, starting with Black and
Scholes (1973), it has been well-known that distinctions between
the two probabilities (and the ‘drift’) do not matter to option
values (in terms of prices of other assets) at a given time, if the
option can be perfectly hedged or replicated.high-rated versus low-rated tranches created from CDOs
during the recent crisis. Scheicher (2010) notes that CDS
spreads for the senior-most tranche went up by a factor of
48 from June 2007 to September 2008 (soon after the
Lehman Brothers default). In contrast, over the same
period, spreads of the junior-most tranche increased by
a relatively modest factor of about 3. Further work can
seek to directly empirically examine implications of both
our results using appropriate direct tests on corporate
bonds.
Concluding remarks
We have reviewed the meaning of risk-neutral probabilities
in general with a particular focus on credit markets and
their relationship with actual probabilities. Our analysis is
intended to facilitate a more nuanced understanding of the
relationship between the two probabilities. RNPDs can
differ across issuers not just because their underlying APDs
may differ but also with changing (absolute) risk aversion
over time and with varying macroeconomic states. This has
implications for the cross-sectional behaviour of market-
implied probabilities. For instance, the market’s reaction
to bad news about default prospects should be stronger for
a bond the lower that its APD is. Bonds whose defaults
occur in poor macroeconomic circumstances hurt investors
more. One bond’s default would be expected to hurt less
than that of another if the former default event is expected
to coincide with states where the investor’s portfolio is, for
other reasons, doing well. The main implications of our
story are consistent with certain characteristics of market
data that appear to have puzzled several observers. Other
properties were set out using simple economic analysis.
It is important to recognise that our results are consis-
tent, in a qualitative sense, with a modelling approach that
is more quantitative and of the sort typically used in
derivatives valuation e whether of the structural or
reduced form types, and whether set in continuous or
discrete time, and also with regard to other refinements
such as incomplete information about an issuer’s liabilities.
Essentially, the crux of asset pricing theory’s central
economic implication applies even for individual credits e
systematic risk matters and will impact the ratio of a bond’s
RNPD to its APD.
We have described credit risk pricing based on an
assumption of at least some rational investors in a (state-
preference) framework that is common to neoclassical
financial economics even if under-appreciated amongst
practitioners.24 Two other ways of expressing the lessons
herein are as follows. First, rare or so-called tail risks (e.g.
default of an Aaa bond) are, in fact, priced at much more
than a simple consideration of their historical odds of
occurrence may suggest relative to the cost of less infre-
quent risks (e.g. default of a Ba bond). This message is
significant given a barrage of ill-informed views, in our24 Another assumption we have made, that is also common to this
approach, is that of no frictions. Relaxing this would lead to
clientele effects and segmentation in markets both of which are, to
one degree or another, familiar in the credit arena.
150 S. Murthyopinion, since the recent credit crisis about the deficiencies
of pricing models. Another implication relates to how
someone who does not understand (or believe in) the
systematic risk rationale may approach investing. If he sees
Aaa bonds as being priced efficiently, then Ba bonds may
appear to be priced too high and such a ‘conservative’
investor may shy away from long positions in ‘junk’ debt.
Conversely, to an investor who views Ba bonds as efficiently
valued, Aaa bonds may appear to be priced too low: such an
investor accustomed to high yields from lower rated debt
may seek similar expected returns through leveraged
purchases of investment grade bonds without under-
standing the true risks. Both these implications are
distressingly familiar given the recent credit crisis.
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